U.S. District Court Upholds Department of the Interior\u27s Sale of Coal Mining Leases by Lucchesi, Peter R.
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 2
U.S. District Court Upholds Department of the
Interior's Sale of Coal Mining Leases
Peter R. Lucchesi
Copyright c 1988 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Peter R. Lucchesi, U.S. District Court Upholds Department of the Interior's Sale of Coal Mining Leases,
13 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1 (1988), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol13/
iss1/2
"U. S. DISTRICT COURT UPHOLDS DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR'S
SALE OF COAL MINING LEASES"
By: Peter R. Lucchesi
The National Wildlife Federation and other environmental
groups are appealing a decision by the U.S. District Court in
Billings, Montana, allowing the Department of the Interior to
lease thousands of acres of federal land to private companies for
coal mining. The lease sales occurred in 1982, and they were
part of a major policy move by the Reagan administration to lease
millions of acres of federally owned land, primarily in the
Western United States, to private companies for a wide range of
industrial activity. The administration wanted to encourage
industrial use of these lands, and believed that private
companies would operate in a more efficient and economical manner
than any government enterprise.1 Considering the vast amount of
land potentially available for leasing, and the environmental
effects of any type of industrial activity, court decisions
regarding any aspect of this policy are of major importance.
The suit requested declaratory and injunctive relief against
the decision by the Secretary of the Interior, (who, at the time,
was James Watt), to sell coal leases on over twenty thousand
acres of federal land in the Powder River Coal Region, located in
southeastern Montana and northern Wyoming. The district court,
1 Note, "Sales of Public Land: A Problem in Legislative and
Judicial Control of Administrative Action," 96 Harvard L.R., 927
(1983).
in National Wildlife Federation v. Robert Burford, et. al., 2 held
that the Department of the Interior had not abused its discretion
in approving the leases.
Several federal statutes were examined in detail. These
were the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.
1201 et. seg. (1977), the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et. seg. (1976), and the Mineral Lands
Leasing Act, as amended by the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments
Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et. seg. (1976). The statutes contain
numerous environmental guidelines and regulations. These guide-
lines are consolidated by and provided with a means of implemen-
tation by the Federal Coal Management Program regulations, 43
C.F.R. § 3400 et. seg. (1981)3
The Federal Coal Management program was developed by the
Department of the Interior in the late 1970's in anticipation of
renewed federal leasing after almost a decade of inactivity. 4 The
regulations set up four steps which the Department must take
before it may sell any lease. The steps are creating a land use
plan, developing a separate activity plan, setting up the lease
sale procedure, and determining the allowable type of mining.
5
The central controversy was over the land use plan eventually
adopted by the Department. The Department's bidding procedure
2 No. CV-82-117-BLG, U.S. District Court, for the District
of Montana, Billings Division, Sept. 3, 1985.
3 No. CV-82-117-BLG, at 6
4 Id., at 5.
5 Id., at 6.
for selling the land was also challenged. The challenged sale
represented the largest amount of coal ever offered-by the federal
government in a single lease sale.
6
Land use planning is a mechanism for determining those
federal lands which are entitled to further consideration for
coal leasing.7 These plans are developed by the Bureau of Land
Management, which is part of the Department of the Interior. The
land use plan is the initial step in the overall lease sale
scheme. Officially termed a "management framework plan," the
guidelines were initially set up by the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act. 8  In the Powder River leases, the National
Wildlife Federation and other plaintiffs focused their attack on
one particular aspect of the management framework plan, the
"Unsuitability Criteria" set forth in the Federal Coal Management
Program regulations.9 These criteria set out in detailed fashion
areas of "critical environmental, historical and ecological
characteristics" on which mining will be prohibited.1 0 The
particular criteria examined by the court will be discussed later.
The stated policy behind the management framework plans is
for public lands to be retained in federal ownership and control
"unless as a result of land use planning procedures . . . it is
determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the
6 Id., at 6.
7 Id., at 6.
8 43 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
9 43 C.F.R. § 3461 (a-t), (1981)
10 43 C.F.R. 3461.1 (1981)
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national interest. 11  The national interest will "be best
realized if the public lands are periodically and systematically
inventoried and their present and future use is projected through
a land use planning process coordinated with other Federal and
State planning efforts."'12 The Secretary of the Interior is also
directed to manage public lands "in a manner that will protect the
quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmen-
tal, a:ir, water, and archeological values, and, if appropriate,
provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife (and) for outdoor
recreation and human use."
13
The land lease bidding requirements challenged by the
plaintiffs are detailed in several sections of the Federal Coal
Management Program regulations. Some important requirements
include fair market value determinations, providing notice of the
sale, environmental impact statements for certain leases, and
surface owner consent. 14 However, none of these requirements were
at issue. What was at issue was the Secretary's decision to
change the bidding procedures just prior to the lease sales, and
whether he had the discretionary right to do so.
The lease sale bidding procedures and the land use planning
unsuitability criteria were not the only issues before the court.
The defendants, including the Department of the Interior, its
Secretary, the State of Wyoming, Shell Oil Company, and other
11 43 U.S.C 1701(a)(1) (1976)
12 43 U.S.C 1701(a) (2).
13 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (a)(8).
14 See generally 43 C.F.R. 9 3422-3427.
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private mining companies, claimed that the National Wildlife
Federation and several other local environmental groups lacked
standing as plaintiffs, and also that the plaintiffs discovery
requests were too broad. The courts' determinations on these four
issues will now be examined.
I. STANDING
The court concluded that the plaintiffs easily satisfied
standing requirements, and cited several U.S. Supreme Court
decisions to support its findings. "The gist of the case or
controversy requirement of Article II is that a plaintiff must
have a sufficient personal interest at stake to assure the Court
that the issues raised shall be adversely and sharply
presented.",15  The plaintiff must allege "injury in fact and a
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested would
prevent or redress the injury."'16
The district court then applied these constitutional
standards to the various environmental groups. "Plaintiffs,
organizations devoted to conservation, education, the environment,
and protection of the agricultural industry in the Powder River
region represent themselves and their individual members. Each
organization alleges that it has members who live, work and
regularly use lands that will be affected by the coal leasing. An
organization has standing to sue on behalf of injured members even
15 Baker v. Carr, 359 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
16 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
in absence of injury to itself." 17
The court noted that the plaintiffs were also provided with
statutory standing. The Administrative Procedure Act entitles a
person to judicial review when they suffer any "legal wrong
because of an agency action, or are aggrieved or adversely
affected by an agency action within the meaning of the relevant
statute."'18 Since organizations have standing to sue on behalf of
adversely affected members, the only other question was whether
the interests affected were under the "zone of interests" to be
protected by the statute.19 In light of the strong environmental
concerns stated in the Federal Coal Management Program and other
federal statutes incorporated into it, the district court had no
problem finding the environmental and ecological interests of the
plaintiffs to be adequately covered.
20
The court's standing requirements for environmental groups
was lenient. Clearly for environmental groups, problems of
adequate standing should not be difficult in courts that follow
the district court in this case. As long as an environmental
group alleges that some of its members will be adversely affected,
and that, if they're basing their claim on a statute, their
interests are within the interests to be protected by the statute,
17 National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, CV-82-117-BLG,
Sept. 1, 1985, at 19. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
511 (1975).
18 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966).
19 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-153. (1970).
20 CV-82-117-BLG, at 20.
it will have standing.
II. DISCOVERy
The National Wildlife Federation and other plaintiffs asked
for extensive discovery materials from the defendants, including
all reports, documents and memoranda referring to the Powder River
region land use plans. The district court rejected these requests.
"The record to be examined is that which was before the agency at
the time the decision being reviewed was made, and it consists of
all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by
agency decision makers and includes evidence contrary to the
agency's position."'2 1 The court was worried that extensive dis-
covery requirements covering all deliberations of agency personnel
would have "a dampening effect on the candid exchange" between
agency decision makers.
22
Four situations were proposed in which further discovery
requests could be justified. These were:
(A) When the record needs to be expanded to explain agency
action;
(B) When the agency has relied on documents or materials not
included in the record;
(C) To explain or clarify technical matters involved in the
decision; and,
(D) When there has been a strong showing of a claim of bad
faith or improper behavior on the part of agency
21 CV-82-117-BLG. at 24.
22 Id. at 26.
decision makers. 23
Overall, the court gave great deference to the Department of
the Interior's ability to choose between all the reports, docu-
ments and memorandums generated for developing its land use plans,
those specific ones "relied upon" for the agency's ultimate
decision. Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiff's assertion
that more documents had to be examined due to possible bad faith
influence by private coal companies on the Department as mere
speculation. "Inquiry into the mental process of administrative
decision makers is usually to be avoided."'24 In spite of the
district court's narrow view of the discovery exceptions, other
courts with a more expansive interpretation of them probably could
find reasons for further discovery. The ability of a plaintiff to
obtain more documents than just those offered by the agency will
therefore be heavily dependent on the particular court's view-
point.
III. LAND USE PLANNING-UNSUITABILITY CRITERIA
The Federal Coal Management Program regulations provide a
list of twenty unsuitability criteria to "be applied to all coal
lands with development potential identified in the comprehensive
land use plan or land use analysis." 25 At the outset of the case,
the court stated its opinion about the proper scope of inquiry
23 Id. at 26. The court adopted the holding of the Ninth
Circuit in Public Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791 (9th
Cir. 1982).
24 id. at 26.
25 43 C.F.R. 9 3461.1, 3461.3-1 (1982).
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into the Department's application of the unsuitability criteria.
"The court must consider whether the agency's decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has
been a clear error of judgment. Although inquiry into the facts
is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is
to be a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its
judgement for that of the agency."'26 Agency decisions could be
reversed as arbitrary and capricious only if the agency failed to
provide a reasonable basis for its decision, and the court should
confine its review to. the full administrative record before the
agency.
27
For several of the Montana tracts of land, the National
Wildlife Federation claimed that the Department failed to satisfy
Criteria 15. This provides that lands unsuitable for mining shall
include "Federal lands which the surface management agency and the
state jointly agree are fish and wildlife habitat for resident
species of high interest to the state and which are essential for
maintaining these priority wildlife species." Among the areas
protected are "active dancing and strutting grounds" for sharp
tailed grouse (a game bird noted for its spectacular display of
colors somewhat like the peacock). A lease could be issued if
"after consultation with the state, the surface management agency
determines that all or certain stipulated methods of coal mining
will not have a significant long-term impact on the species being
26 Id., at 13, see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Vol. P.e. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
27 Id. at 13, see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142
(1973).
protected. ,
,28
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that Criteria
15 had not been satisfied. The official administrative records
provided by the Bureau of Land Management indicated that consul-
tations had occurred with the Montana Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks, and as a result stipulations were written into
the lease requiring that before any mining would occur, the mining
companies would assure the Department of State Lands that "no
significant long term negative impact on the short tail grouse
and their habitat would occur.,,29
In Wyoming, the National Wildlife Federation challenged the
Department's actions regarding Criteria 3. This provides that
land unsuitable for mining shall include "lands within 100 feet of
the outside line of the right of way of a public road or within
100 feet of a cemetery, or within 300 feet of any public building,
school, church, community or institutional building or public park
or within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling. Exceptions are pro-
vided in certain cases after a public hearing with written notice
has been held, or consent of dwelling owners has been obtained. 30
The Wyoming tracts contained several public highways. The court
again noted that the official administrative record showed that
the highways had been considered and that the lessee, Shell Oil
Company, allowed in its lease a stipulation that it would honor
28 43 C.F.R. § 3461.1(0)(1) (1982).
29 National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, CV-82-117-BLG,
at 45.
30 43 C.F.R. 9 3461.1 (c)(1-2) (1982).
the 100 foot limits regardless of what the mining plans might
show, and that it would eventually relocate one of the affected
highways.
3 1
The third criteria raised by the plaintiffs was Criteria 7.
This provides that unsuitable lands shall include "all publicly
owned places on the National Register of Historic places . . .
(including) any areas that the surface management agency deter-
mines, after consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation and the State Historic Preservation Officer, are
necessary to protect the inherent values of the property."
'32
On one of the Wyoming tracts a prehistoric site was located
during the preparation of the land use plan. The Bureau of Land
Management never consulted with the Advisory Council and the State
Historic Preservation Officer about the site, but the court did
not find this an absolutely necessary requirement. The
administrative record showed that "considerable attention" had
been given to the site, as evidenced by the stipulation in the
lease that "all cultural resources within the area would be
protected from lease related activities until any cultural
resource mitigation measures could be implemented." Moreover, the
lessee, Shell Oil Company, promised to consult with the Advisory
Council and State Historic Preservation Officer before any mining
began.3 3
All three challenges based on the Federal Land Management
31 CV-82-117-BLG, at 49.
32 43 C.F.R. 9 3461.1, (g),(1) (1982).
33 CV-82-117-BLG, at 51.
Program regulations were rejected by the district court. The
basic message the court gave was that there had to be some
evidence in the official administrative records (those records
used by the Department in reaching its decision and offered to the
court in discovery proceedings) that the unsuitability criteria
were considered. Also, there had to be some stipulation or
promise by the lessee to follow those provisions and consult with
any necessary agency. "It is within the authority and discretion
of the Department to enter into lease stipulations to limit
surface coal mining operations on areas that have been designated
unsuitable. ''34 What the land use plan does not require is an
actual scheme for following the unsuitability criteria.
IV. BIDDING PROCEDURES
In March 1982, just prior to the lease sales, Secretary of
the Interior Watt changed the bidding procedures on lands with
non-transferrable consents to surface mining, which allowed only
the particular lessee on the land to do any mining activity; no
consents to other private companies to mine on the land could be
given. Originally, any bidding procedure was controlled by the
lessee, who set the price. The Secretary's decision changed to
allow competitive bidding by any interested company, with the
hope that competitive bidding would-take less time, attract a
greater number of companies, and through these companies bidding
with each other competitively, perhaps secure a higher price on
the lease for the federal government.
34 Id. at 49.
The Secretary's decision could be overruled only if it con-
stituted agency rule making, and not simply a change in policy.
Policy changes are a matter of agency discretion, while rule
making involves certain procedural requirements including notice
and hearings about the proposed rule change.35
The district court defined a rule to "establish a standard of
conduct which has the force and effect of law. A rule affects the
rights and obligations of the parties being regulated."3 6 A
policy, on the other hand, "establishes non-binding norms of
flexible criteria which do not have the force or effect of law,"
and is directed not towards the regulated industries, but towards
agency personnel. 37 Using this analysis, the court decided that
change in bidding procedures is a policy decision entirely within
the Department's discretion. "The mere setting (of) depart-
mental guidelines for the future leasing of tracts, as long as
fair market value is received and a tract is otherwise properly'
leased, (is within) the Department's choice."'38
The assertion that policy decisions affect agency personnel
and not the regulated industries is difficult to accept. The
change in bidding procedures will ultimately have a substantial
impact on both the industries doing the bidding and the land
35 Id. at 65; see the Administrative Proceedures Act, 5
U.S.C. 9 553 (1966).
36 Id. at 66; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
297 (1979).
37 Id. at 66, see also Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2nd.
Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975).
38 Id., at 67.
rule making and policymaking could be drawn, and that the
definitions they adopted were the most sensible. The court also
noted that neither the Federal Coal Management Program regulations
or any other of the federal statutes involved actually mandated a
specific method of bidding.39 The inference from all of this is
that one should look to actual statutory changes or requirements
to find rule making decisions, and not simply administrative
record reports.
CONCLUSION
The district court's holding clearly shows the problems with
challenging agency decisions. On the positive side, the court
adopted a liberal standard for environmental and other public
interest groups to achieve standing to challenge such decisions.
The court was also willing to go into detailed statutory analysis
and examination of agency records to find evidence of agency
compliance with statutory requirements. The terms of compliance,
however, consisted basically of consideration of statutory
requirements and promises to ultimately follow those requirements.
No actual plan for compliance was necessary. Discovery was
limited only to those agency records actually used by the agency
in reaching its decision. Discovery was limited only to these
agency records actually used by the agency in reaching its
decisions. Essentially, this good faith reliance on the agency's
complete discretion in choosing which records to submit. Also, an
agency may get away with decisions which are "policy chores" even
39 Id., at 68.
though such decisions may have a huge impact on the lands
regulated by the agency.
Because the Reagan Administration, through the Department of
the Interior, wants to lease millions of acres of federal land for
industrial activity, any limitation on the agency's discretion to
do so would be welcomed. Instead, absent clear neglect or a
deliberate attempt to disregard statutory requirements, it will be
extremely difficult to overturn agency decisions regarding private
industrial use of federally owned lands.
